Search results for "Simultaneous game"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
Robust dynamic cooperative games
2009
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables. In this work we still consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded disturbances. We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family of games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions’ values and corresponds to a specific game. We consider a dynamic context where while we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run, at each t…
A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma
2016
We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…
Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations
2016
This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.
Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors
2013
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic, stochastic or interval valued TU games as it combines dynamics of the game with an allocation protocol for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The protocol is an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers a paradigmatic mathematical description of negotiation and bargaining processes. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protoc…
The video game experience as 'true' identification: A theory of enjoyable alterations of players' self-perception
2009
This article introduces an explication of video game players' identification with a game character or role that is based on social-psychological models of self-perception. Contrasting with conventional ("dyadic" ) notions of media user-character relationships (e.g., parasocial interaction or affective disposition theory), ("monadic" ) video game identification is defined as a temporal shift of players' self-perception through adoption of valued properties of the game character. Implications for media enjoyment, the measurement of identification, and media effects are discussed. © 2009 International Communication Association.